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Abstract 
Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that—
according to Buddhaghosa—should be evoked by meditat-
ing on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and 
how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This ar-
ticle presents a theory of saṃvega—what it is and how it 
works—based on recent insights in psychology. According 
to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental 
processes organized in two “systems”: the experiential, 
automatic system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. 
In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its 
own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly 
realizes that the “subjective self” will inevitably die (while 
system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject’s mor-
tality). This results in a state of shock that is morally mo-
tivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mor-
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tality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in 
combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness 
or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight 
in suffering produce moral motivation. 
 
Introduction 
The Pāli/Sanskrit term “saṃvega”—literally meaning (fearful) trem-
bling—is used in Buddhist writings to denote a religiously and morally 
motivating state of shock or agitation.2 For example, Aṅguttaranikāya 
4.113 describes four kinds of persons being shocked (saṃvijjati) into a 
state of saṃvega by stories or experiences of suffering; Śāntideva writes 
that “the virtue of suffering has no rival, since, from the shock [saṃvega] 
it causes, intoxication falls away and there arises compassion for those in 
cyclic existence, fear of evil, and a longing for the Conqueror [i.e., the 
Buddha]” (Bodhicaryāvatāra 6.21); and Buddhaghosa suggests that the 
(repeated) experience of saṃvega decreases attachments (Visuddhimagga 
III.58), and increases loving-kindness (XIII.35) and vigor (XIV.137). 
Saṃvega is (obviously) a disturbing experience—disturbing 
enough to result in a profound change in the attitudes, beliefs, and/or 
values of the person experiencing it—but its beneficial effects are reason 
to seek rather than to avoid it. Towards this end, Buddhaghosa recom-
mends meditating on the subject of death. One may accidentally experi-
ence saṃvega in the course of ordinary life (in encountering death and 
suffering particularly), but meditation is the primary means to intention-
                                                
2See, for example, Brekke, and Heim. Coomaraswamy translates “saṃvega” as “aesthetic 
shock” and quotes a number of occurrences in non-Buddhist texts, where it means 
(fearful) trembling. The term is often translated as “sense of urgency,” but other trans-
lations, including “shock” and “terror,” can be found. 
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ally achieve saṃvega. In the section on death as a meditation subject 
(VIII.1-41), Buddhaghosa describes a number of meditation exercises fo-
cusing on the absolute unavoidability, finality and irreversibility of 
death. Saṃvega is the aim and purpose of these exercises: as VIII.5-6 
makes clear, meditation on death is successful only if it results in saṃve-
ga.3 (See also III.58.) 
Death is one of two general meditation subjects—the other is a 
gradually extending loving-kindness—which “are needed generally and 
desirable owing to their great helpfulness” (III.57-59). Hence, meditating 
on death is not some kind of curiosity or extravagance, but is one of the 
most basic and most important exercises. And by implication, the expe-
rience of saṃvega is—at least for Buddhaghosa—among the most basic 
and most important goals of meditation. This, of course, conflicts with 
the image of (Buddhist) meditation as stress-reduction spread by the 
mindfulness industry, but as pointed out by Donald Lopez (108) and oth-
ers, that image is very wrong. The goal of (at least some forms of) Bud-
dhist meditation is stress induction, rather than stress reduction. Or, as 
Paul Williams remarks, “the spiritual path is not one of comfortable feel-
ings and acceptance. It is deeply uncomfortable” (xxv). 
There are very many different types of Buddhist meditation,4 but 
traditionally, two main kinds are distinguished. Tranquility (Pāli: sa-
                                                
3The same passage also clarifies that saṃvega should not be confused with something 
like sorrow. 
4This variety suggests that “meditation” is a functional rather than a substantive cate-
gory, which is also supported by Buddhaghosa’s refusal to define “meditation” because 
it “is of many sorts and has various aspects” and an attempt to definition would only 
“lead to distraction” (III.2). “Meditation,” then, is not defined by some substantive 
properties that all activities called “meditation” have in common, but by those activi-
ties’ function, by what meditation is intended to establish. However, even a functional 
definition of “meditation” would probably have to be disjunctive, as there does not 
 
86 Brons, Saṃvega and Moral Psychology 
 
matha/Sanskrit: śamatha) meditation aims at achieving states of concen-
tration called jhānas/dhyānas in which all attention is focused on its ob-
ject. Tranquility meditation is associated with mindfulness (sati/smṛti) 
and is primarily a collection of techniques for improving the ability to 
concentrate, which is necessary for the second kind of meditation. That 
second kind of meditation is insight (vipassanā/vipaśyanā) meditation. 
Hence, except perhaps in Chan/Zen (which takes its name from the Chi-
nese translation of “dhyāna”), tranquility meditation is not an end in it-
self but means towards the end of achieving insight. Insight does not re-
sult from mere concentration—as Lopez remarks, insight meditation “of-
ten entails a process of reflection, and even discursive reasoning, in 
which a thoroughgoing mental search is launched by the mind” (88).5 
The insight to be achieved is of a threefold nature: insight into (or un-
derstanding of) impermanence (anicca/anitya), insight into no-self (anat-
tā/anitya), and insight into suffering (dukkha/duḥkha). 
It is not immediately clear how meditation on death fits into this 
classification. The explicit aim and purpose of meditation on death is 
saṃvega, which may be conducive to other kinds of meditation and reli-
gious activity in general, but which is neither concentration nor insight 
itself. On the other hand, saṃvega is not exactly not concentration or not 
insight either (pardon the double negations). It is not not concentration, 
because one of its (supposed) effects is to focus (i.e., concentrate) the 
mind on religious and moral goals; it is not not insight, because death 
                                                                                                                     
seem to be a single purpose, goal, or function that all activities called “meditation” 
share. 
5While this conflicts with the popular view of meditation, it is very much in line with 
the English term’s etymology. The English term “meditation” comes from Latin “medi-
tari” meaning cogitation, contemplation, pondering, thinking deeply, and so forth. Un-
til fairly recently, occurrences of the term and its cognates in European languages re-
ferred to meditation in this sense. An obvious example is that of Descartes’s Meditations 
on First Philosophy. 
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has obvious relations to impermanence, no-self, and suffering, and in-
sight into death is inseparable from insight into those. This ambiguity is 
closely related to the obscurity of the notion of saṃvega itself. That no-
tion raises a number of puzzling questions to which Buddhaghosa offers 
no answers: What kind of state is saṃvega? How does it produce its sup-
posed effects? How can a shocking realization of one’s mortality be mor-
ally motivating? It is these questions that this article aims to answer. 
It should be noted that these questions about a certain mental 
state and its effects are psychological questions primarily, even if they 
are of hermeneutical interest as well. By implication, this article is not 
concerned with Buddhaghosa’s theory of saṃvega (if he had one) except 
insofar as elements thereof contribute towards the project of answering 
these questions by means of a (more or less) naturalistic account of that 
mental state. Consequently, this is not an article in Buddhology or in phi-
losophy as traditionally conceived, but in theoretical moral psychology 
(or in the kind of “natural(istic) philosophy” that rejects boundaries be-
tween philosophy and theoretical science). Nevertheless, the article’s 
topic has thus far been of interest to philosophers and religious thinkers 
mainly, and even if it does not belong to philosophy in some (overly) 
strict sense, it does aim to contribute to philosophy of religion and to 
moral philosophy—including Buddhist ethics—as well as to moral psy-
chology.6 
                                                
6To what extent a naturalistic account of what saṃvega is (or could possibly be) and how 
it could motivate—given all we know about the human mind—can contribute to Bud-
dhist thought is debatable, because it is conceivable that naturalistic and Buddhist ac-
counts of saṃvega turn out to be incompatible. One of the most central doctrines of 
Buddhism is the rejection of annihilationism (ucchedadṛṣṭi—the view that the self is an-
nihilated at death) and eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi—the view that the self survives death) 
in favor of a “middle way,” but that middle way depends on commitments to 
mind/body dualism, kamma/karma, and rebirth, and none of these commitments are 
compatible with contemporary science. Rather, contemporary science is uncompromis-
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From Buddhaghosa’s writings (and other occurrences in Buddhist 
literature mentioned above) a number of essential features of saṃvega—
or a “samvegic” mental state—can be inferred. As a rough definition, I 
propose the following: 
Saṃvega (or a “samvegic” state) is 
(a) an occurrent (i.e., non-persistent) mental state with 
relatively short duration (better measured in minutes 
than in longer units of time), 
(b) that is shocking/agitating and absorbing (i.e., it is a 
state that disturbs and that completely takes over the 
conscious mind), 
(c) that is related to some kind of realization of one’s mor-
tality (such that either it is that realization or it is caused 
by it), and 
(d) that is religiously and/or morally motivating. 
In the Western philosophical tradition, states similar (or identical, per-
haps) to saṃvega have been mentioned by Epictetus and Søren Kierke-
gaard,7 and more recently by Thomas Nagel, Mark Johnston, and James 
                                                                                                                     
ingly annihilationist (as understood here), and by implication, so is the account of 
saṃvega presented in this article. I don’t think that this implies an incompatibility with 
Buddhist accounts of saṃvega, however, or with Buddhaghosa’s writings in particular, 
but I will make no attempt to defend that belief here. 
7Søren Kierkegaard (Sickness, Anxiety) suggested that a kind of existential shock or dread 
could be a religious motivator, and the teachings of Epictetus include some (cryptic) 
references to a shocking or agitating mental state related to the fear of death (e.g., Dis-
courses II.1.10). According to Epictetus, this mental state should not be avoided or re-
pressed, but one should learn to not let oneself be (outwardly) disturbed by it. A pas-
sage in The Manual suggests that it should even be cultivated because a daily reminder 
of one’s inevitable death is a powerful motivator to do the right thing (§21). 
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Baillie. However, in all five cases it is uncertain whether the states men-
tioned actually satisfy all four criteria mentioned. Furthermore, with the 
exception of Baillie, these accounts offer little explanation of what kind 
of state saṃvega is (assuming that the states they mention are samvegic 
states indeed) and how it works. Baillie describes a state in which “ra-
tional capacities are immobilized and one is engulfed in inarticulate ter-
ror” (S188) and that satisfies the first three criteria, but possibly not the 
fourth. About his experience of that state he writes: 
I entered into a state of mind unlike anything I had expe-
rienced before. I realized that I will die. It may be tomor-
row, it may be in fifty years time, but one way or another 
it is inevitable and utterly non-negotiable. I no longer just 
knew this theoretically, but knew it in my bones. . . . It was 
as if the blinders had been removed, and I was the only 
person to have woken up from a collective dream to grasp 
the terror of the situation. (S189) 
Clearly, Baillie’s experience satisfies criteria (a), (b), and (c). He does not 
describe it as morally (or religiously) motivating, but he does claim that 
it “was a pivotal moment in [his] life, with a significant influence on [his] 
future attitudes and actions” (S190). That—I think—is close enough to 
the spirit of criterion (d) to classify his experience as saṃvega, especially 
if it is taken into consideration that (d) is the supposed effect of saṃvega 
and that there is no reason to assume that saṃvega has the exact same 
effect on everyone and in all circumstances (implying that criterion (d) 
should not be taken as a necessary condition). Furthermore, regardless 
of whether Baillie experienced saṃvega in some strict sense, he offers a 
theoretical explanation of the state he experienced that explains what 
kind of state saṃvega is, although some amendments are necessary 
(largely due to the naturalistic commitment mentioned above). Because 
he did not consider his experience morally motivating, Baillie has noth-
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ing to offer with regards to the second question—how saṃvega works—
however, but Terror Management Theory gives a partial answer to that 
question. 
The following three sections give an answer to the question of 
what kind of state saṃvega is based on Baillie’s theory, which is summa-
rized first, followed by the identification of a number of minor problems 
and amendments to fix those. In the section after that I investigate 
whether saṃvega is necessarily related to “the full appreciation of our 
mortality” (Baillie S188), and conclude that this is probably the case. 
How saṃvega works—that is, how samvegic shock produces moral motiva-
tion—is discussed in the section after that. I argue in that section that 
the combination with loving-kindness meditation recommended by 
Buddhaghosa is essential for its morally motivating effects. The final sec-
tion summarizes this article’s findings before turning—briefly—to the 
practical question whether these two meditation subjects, death and lov-
ing-kindness, should indeed be recommended (as Buddhaghosa does). 
 
James Baillie on the “Expectation of Nothingness” 
In “The Expectation of Nothingness,” James Baillie attempts to answer a 
puzzling epistemological question about a sense of terror or panic result-
ing from “the full appreciation of our mortality” (S188). Borrowing a 
term from Thomas Nagel, he calls this state the “expectation of nothing-
ness,” but as suggested above, I will assume that the state he experi-
enced and tries to explain is saṃvega and will call it such. 
Baillie’s question is: Given that I already knew that I will one day 
die, how can I be shocked by that fact? In his answer he builds on ideas 
by Thomas Nagel and Mark Johnston, but most of all on Tamar Szabó 
Gendler’s notion of “alief” (“Belief,” “Action”). Gendler introduced the 
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alief/belief contrast in an attempt to explain the discrepancy between 
our explicit beliefs and what our behavior seems to indicate about our 
beliefs in (what came to be called) “Gendler cases.” One of her recurring 
examples is the Skywalk, a glass-floored horseshoe-shaped structure 
above the Grand Canyon. No one would enter the Skywalk without be-
lieving it is safe, but many people feel very unsafe seeing the abyss below 
their feet, and many have considerable difficulty not to act in accord-
ance with that feeling. According to Gendler, we believe that we are safe, 
but we alieve (something like) “Really high up, long, long way down. Not 
a safe place to be! Get off!!” (“Belief” 635). In the case of the Skywalk ex-
ample and other Gendler cases, aliefs are belief-discordant: there is a dis-
crepancy between the subject’s aliefs and (explicit) beliefs. 
Gendler provisionally characterizes aliefs as “associative, auto-
matic, and arational”; as “states we share with nonhuman animals”; as 
“developmentally and conceptually antecedent to other cognitive atti-
tudes”; and as “typically also affect-laden and action generating” (“Belief” 
641; italics in original). “A paradigmatic alief is a mental state with asso-
ciatively linked content that is representational, affective, and behavior-
al, and that is activated—consciously or nonconsciously—by features of 
the subject’s internal or ambient environment” (642). In such a state, the 
subject alieves R-A-B, in which R is “the representation of some object or 
concept or situation or circumstance,” A is “the experience of some af-
fective or emotional state,” and B is “the readying of some motor rou-
tine” (643). Aliefs can be occurrent or dispositional. The characterization 
of a “paradigmatic alief” as an activated mental state characterizes an 
occurrent alief. A subject has a dispositional alief with content R-A-B “when 
there is some (potential) internal or external stimulus such that, were 
she to encounter it, would cause her to occurrently alieve R-A-B” (645). 
James Baillie explains the samvegic experience of “the expectation 
of nothingness” as involving an alief that I (i.e., the alieving subject) will 
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(some day) die. He distinguishes three kinds of mental states, A-states, N-
states, and E-states, that differ in the nature (and content) of the belief-
like mental states involved. In an A-state the subject’s belief that she will 
die is dispositional. This is our ordinary state in which we are absorbed 
in everyday tasks and do not think about our mortality, but in which we 
would admit that we are mortal when asked. At that point we would en-
ter an N-state. In an N-state the subject occurrently believes that she will 
die. What distinguishes an E-state from an N-state is that in an E-state a 
belief-concordant alief that I will die is added. This, however, is only part 
of Baillie’s analysis, as he further observes a difference in the content of 
the aliefs and beliefs that I will die, namely: the “I” of the alief is not the 
“I” of the belief. 
The “I” of the belief that I will die is (more or less) Thomas 
Nagel’s “objective self.” It is the publicly accessible person referred to by 
me in the first person singular that is a part of objective reality; it is a 
somewhat abstract and relatively emotionally neutral “I.” The “I” of the 
alief, on the other hand, is what Mark Johnston calls “the one at the cen-
ter of this arena of presence and action” (139); it is the subjective “I.” 
While the objective “I” of the belief is a perceived “I” (or “me”), the sub-
jective “I” of the alief is the subject of perception (i.e., that what per-
ceives) itself. And while the belief is about an objective future world mi-
nus the human being that is me, the alief is about the cessation of the 
subjective world: the alief that I die represents the fact that my world 
(i.e., this arena of presence and action) will cease to exist. In other 
words, contrary to the belief, the alief confronts me with an absolute and 
unavoidable finality, with the fact that it does not even make sense to 
speak of “nothingness” beyond death because there is no “beyond” 
death. 
Beliefs about the objective “I” or self give rise to the “‘not me’ 
phenomenon.” Arguments about my death are framed by my mind in 
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terms of the publicly accessible, objective “I,” and “this restriction cre-
ates the ‘not me’ phenomenon, where even the explicit avowal of the 
belief that I will die is kept at a distance, as about someone in the objecti-
fied world, who is seen as accidentally related to . . . the subjective ‘I’” 
(S200). Because of this phenomenon, “N is an essentially dissociated con-
dition” involving “both believing that I will die, and also not believing it,” 
and states E and N differ in “the levels of psychological integration in-
volved” (S201). 
Although Baillie remains unclear about the exact subject of the 
dissociative belief, his theory seems to imply that the “I” involved is the 
subjective self. In addition to this ambiguity, he offers no argument for 
why this state would have to be a belief rather than an alief, which ap-
pears to be at least equally likely. Taking these ambiguities into account, 
Baillie’s theory can be summarized as follows: 
In all three states—A, N, and E—the subject has a disposi-
tional belief that the objective self will die, and a disposi-
tional belief (or alief) that the (subjective) self will not die. 
In the N-state, the subject has an occurrent belief that the 
objective self will die (realizing the first of the two dispo-
sitions). 
In the E-state (i.e., saṃvega) the subject has an occurrent 
alief that the subjective self will die, temporarily sup-
pressing the dispositional belief (or alief) to the contrary 
(i.e., the second of the two dispositions).8 
                                                
8That the E-state only suppresses the dispositional belief (during that state) in the im-
mortality of the subjective self and does not erase it, is implied by the fact that saṃvega 
is an occurrent state of relatively brief duration (see criterion a in the rough definition 
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In addition to the ambiguity of the dissociative belief in the N-state, there 
are some other weaknesses in Baillie’s account. Mostly these appear to 
be related to Baillie’s framing of the issue as epistemological rather than 
psychological. He attempted to explain how one could be shocked by 
what one already knows, rather than how one can be shocked by what one 
already knows. As a consequence of this framing, his perspective is ex-
clusively informed by philosophical literature and ignores relevant psy-
chological theories. The most obvious example hereof is the unnecessary 
adoption of Gendler’s controversial (philosophical) theory of alief,9 while 
(psychological) dual process theories offer a much more established al-
ternative that can be used toward the same explanatory end, as will be 
shown in the next section. 
The epistemological framing of the issue also produced another 
important oversight. The focusing on the shock of the known takes that 
knowledge for granted. That is, the death-affirming A and N-states are 
normal by definition because of this framing. However, while they may 
indeed be normal states for the average, non-religious, academic philos-
opher, for the vast majority of human beings they are not normal states 
at all. The normal state—according to anthropology or sociology of reli-
gion, for example—is not characterized by a belief that I will die, but by 
the very denial of that fact, by what Ernest Becker famously called “the 
denial of death.” We’ll return to this issue below. 
 
                                                                                                                     
given in the introduction) and that after the experience the subject returns to the A or 
N-state. 
9See, for example, Schwitzgebel; Mandelbaum; or Albahari. 
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Dual Process Theory and Saṃvega  
Since the 1980s, a large body of theoretical and empirical research in so-
cial psychology and related fields of inquiry has resulted in (and has 
been guided by) dual process theories of (aspects of) human cognition and 
decision-making. The defining characteristic of these theories is that 
they classify mental processes into two classes, one of which is (more) 
automatic, while the other is (more) controlled. Although there is con-
siderable disagreement between these theories about the details (hence 
the plural), the core idea that there are such different mental processes 
or “systems” is supported by an abundance of evidence and has become 
a cornerstone of contemporary social psychology.10 
Much of the disagreement between adherents of different dual 
process theories concerns the nature, scope, and workings of the two 
systems. Some are limited in scope in the sense that they just apply to 
certain processes while others are more general. Some propose a radical 
divide between the two systems, while others suggest that they are mere 
extremes on a gamut, or that one is realized in the other. The most con-
spicuous difference between theories, however, is terminological: there 
are no universally accepted labels for the two systems.11 I’ll adopt the 
relatively neutral “system 1” and “system 2” (introduced by Stanovich 
and West) here. 
                                                
10For a recent overview and discussion of dual process theories, see Gawronski and 
Creighton. For a less academic, more accessible, and well-written introduction into one 
particular dual process theory, see Kahneman (Thinking). 
11Typically the two systems are named by means of pairs of adjectives. These adjectival 
name-pairs include heuristic vs. systematic, experiential vs. rational, associative vs. 
rule-based, associative vs. propositional, reflexive vs. reflective, and impulsive vs. reflec-
tive. 
96 Brons, Saṃvega and Moral Psychology 
 
The two systems are often described by means of contrasting 
keywords. For example, system 1 thinking is (usually) faster, while sys-
tem 2 thinking is (usually) slower. In addition to the fast/slow contrast, 
other contrasts often mentioned are automatic/controlled (often con-
sidered to be the defining contrast), associative/rule-governed, uncon-
scious/conscious, slow-learning/flexible, effortless/effortful, con-
crete/abstract, emotional/neutral, arational/rational, and parallel/serial. 
Different dual process theories do not agree which of these contrasts ap-
ply, however. 
Although there are exceptions, philosophers typically assume 
that (their) thinking is characterized by the keywords mentioned for sys-
tem 2 (i.e., those mentioned after the slashes in the previous paragraph), 
but psychological research has shown that people—including philoso-
phers—mostly depend on system 1, and that system 2 is activated only in 
case system 1 cannot find a satisfactory solution to the problem at hand. 
Although system 1 is efficient and gets it right most of the time, it has its 
biases and limitations. For example, in Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel 
Kahneman writes that system 1 “creates a coherent pattern of activated 
ideas in associative memory” and towards that end, “neglects ambigui-
ty,” “suppresses doubt,” “invents causes and intentions,” and is “biased 
to believe and confirm” (105). 
Among the keywords describing system 1 (i.e., those before the 
slashes two paragraphs back) are “associative,” “automatic,” and “ara-
tional.” These are exactly the same keywords Tamar Szabó Gendler used 
to characterize aliefs.12 Hence, aliefs appear to be the system 1 equivalent 
of beliefs, but whether this identification makes sense depends on one’s 
                                                
12The similarity between Gendler’s belief/alief model and (some) dual process theory 
(or theories) was previously observed in Kriegel and J. Nagel. 
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theory of beliefs and on where and how one draws the boundary line be-
tween systems 1 and 2, and neither of these is uncontroversial. 
Belief-like states are mental states (possibly in a loose sense of 
“state”) that are associated with representational or reconstructive con-
tents and behavioral dispositions.13 It is often assumed that beliefs are 
propositional, but belief-like states do not just include believing that p, 
but also taking p for granted, unconsciously assuming that p, consistent-
ly acting as if one believes that p, as well as various other belief-like atti-
tudes towards p. Furthermore, p in “believing (that) p” and so forth is a 
propositional representation of whatever is believed by the subject—in 
this loose sense of believing—but does not necessarily exhaust the con-
tent of that belief. What someone believes may be much richer and/or 
much more indistinct than any propositional representation can cap-
ture. If we assume that both systems have beliefs in this loose sense 
(we’ll turn to the main alternative below), then the beliefs of system 1 
are associative, prototypical (or exemplar-based), and directly based on 
experience, while the beliefs of system 2 involve more reflection (on ex-
perience) and reasoning, and may be more abstract(ed). 
The Skywalk case (see previous section) and other examples of 
belief-discordant aliefs given by Gendler can just as well—if not better—
be explained as conflicting beliefs of system 1 and system 2. In the Sky-
walk case system 1 believes there is danger; system 2 doesn’t. And in the 
case of unconscious racism (Gendler “Epistemic”), the subject’s system 2 
believes that all races are equal, but system 1 is biased against certain 
races. In either case, the automaticity of system 1 is what makes it hard 
                                                
13Although according to mainstream analytic philosophy beliefs are representational, 
the notion of representation and its role in mental states and contents is controversial. 
To me, the notion reeks too much of what Donald Davidson called, “the essentially in-
coherent picture of the mind as a passive but critical spectator of an inner show” (52). 
The mind does not represent but reconstruct or simulate. 
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to control its influence on behavior, and the automatic/controlled con-
trast defines the two systems in many (if not most) dual process theories. 
Similarly, the aliefs and beliefs involved in Baillie’s theory of saṃvega (or 
the “expectation of nothingness”) can be reinterpreted as being beliefs 
of systems 1 and systems 2, respectively. 
An immediate advantage of this reinterpretation is that it solves 
an ambiguity in the original theory. The ambiguous state at the root of 
the “not me” phenomenon was represented as the dispositional belief 
that the subjective self will not die (in the A and N-states), but is more 
plausibly attributed to system 1 than to system 2. The subjective self or 
“I” is what Mark Johnston called “the one at the center of this arena of 
presence and action” (see above). It is (at) the center of subjective reality, 
and the limits of the subjective self are the limits of subjective reality. 
The subjective self is an experiential notion; all experience—by necessi-
ty—is experience of the subjective self (because all experience takes 
place in the arena of which the subjective self is the center). The subjec-
tive self is there in all experience, and cannot not be there, or even imag-
ined not to be there (or to not be). The notion of the subjective self is ex-
periential, automatic, and automatically reinforced by continuing expe-
rience. In other words, it is a paradigm case of a system 1 notion.14 And 
                                                
14Daniel Kahneman (Thinking chapter seven) points out that system 1 only makes use of 
activated/retrieved ideas. System 1 is biased to assume that “what you see is all there 
is.” Importantly, the experiencing self is always there. It isn’t literally seen, of course, 
but is seeing, and makes its presence felt in the act of seeing. What I see is all there is, 
but I am always there, seeing, and “seeing” myself. Kahneman (Thinking part V) also 
suggests a subtly different conceptualization of the two selves or “I” notions involved. 
He distinguishes the experiencing self from the remembering self. The experiencing self is 
(more or less) Johnston’s “center of the arena” or Baillie’s “subjective ‘I’.” The remem-
bering self is a construction by system 2, but is heavily dependent on system 1, and the 
distinction between the two selves in general does not coincide with the two systems. 
The remembering self constructs one’s life story; it is in that sense very similar to the 
notion of the “narrative self” proposed by Daniel Dennett and others, and further de-
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likewise, the unavoidability of the subjective self in all experience gener-
ates and continuously reinforces the system 1 belief that the subjective 
self will always be there. A samvegic shock occurs when system 1 sudden-
ly (i.e., occurrently) believes in its own finality: the arena will cease. 
Amending the previous section’s summary of Baillie’s theory in 
accordance with the foregoing (i.e., the dual process reinterpretation 
and the reclassification of the dispositional death-denying belief) results 
in the following: 
In all three states—A, N, and E—the subject has a disposi-
tional system 2 belief that the objective self will die, and a 
dispositional system 1 belief that the subjective self will 
not die. 
In the N-state, the subject has an occurrent system 2 belief 
that the objective self will die (realizing the first of the 
two dispositions). 
In the E-state (i.e., saṃvega) the subject has an occurrent 
system 1 belief that the subjective self will die, temporari-
ly suppressing the dispositional belief to the contrary (i.e., 
the second of the two dispositions).15 
                                                                                                                     
veloped in Narrative Identity Theory within personality psychology. It is this con-
structed, narrative self that plays the “I” role in the system 2 beliefs in Baillie’s theory: 
those beliefs concern the death of my narratively constructed, remembered self. 
15The occurrent system 1 belief only temporarily suppresses the dispositional system 1 
belief in the immortality of the subjective self, however, and does not (and probably 
cannot) erase it, because that dispositional belief is continuously reinforced by experi-
ence. It is for this reason that saṃvega has a relatively short duration (see criterion (a) 
in the introduction of this article). 
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Obviously, this interpretation depends on the assumption that both sys-
tems 1 and 2 are capable of having beliefs, but as mentioned above, that 
assumption is controversial. Superficially, it may seem undeniable that 
both systems must have (or be able to be in) belief-like states in the loose 
sense of beliefs adopted here. Certainly Kahneman’s depiction of the two 
systems requires the attribution of belief-like states or attitudes to both 
systems, and the common idea that system 1 is prone to certain biases—
such as a bias to infer or invent causal patterns (i.e., causal beliefs!)—and 
that system 2 is capable (in principle) of correcting these makes sense 
only if both systems can have or be in belief-like states. Nevertheless, 
there is reason to suspect that at least one of the two systems does not 
have sufficiently belief-like states. 
Based on extensive reviews of available psychological evidence, 
Peter Carruthers concludes that system 2 is incapable of having beliefs. 
System 1 is a heterogeneous class of unconscious processes; system 2 is 
conscious and takes place in working memory. However, evidence shows 
that all conscious thought is sensory-based, and that all amodal 
thought—such as abstract and conceptual thought—is unconscious. This 
means that beliefs, which are supposed to be amodal, cannot be con-
scious, and therefore, that only system 1 can have beliefs; and that what 
appear to be system 2 beliefs are really episodes of inner (or outer) 
speech (or other kinds of sensory—and therefore, modal—states).16 
Carruthers’s conclusions are as problematic for Baillie’s alief-
based theory of saṃvega as they are for the dual process reinterpretation 
                                                
16The relevant writings by Carruthers are The Opacity of Mind, in which he argues that 
our minds are not transparent to ourselves, or at least not nearly as transparent as we’d 
like to believe; “On Knowing your Own Beliefs” in which he argues most explicitly that 
system 2 cannot have beliefs; and The Centered Mind in which he argues that beliefs and 
decisions are unconscious and that all conscious thought is sensory-based (and thus not 
amodal). 
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thereof a few paragraphs back (as well as for much of the philosophy of 
mind and some other branches of philosophy, but that is of no concern 
here) because both assume that we have conscious amodal beliefs. The 
N-state is defined as involving a conscious amodal belief that the objec-
tive self will (eventually) die, but if there are no conscious amodal states, 
then this is impossible. Nevertheless, this doesn’t necessarily mean that 
the belief-like states involved in Baillie’s theory don’t exist; what it does 
mean is that some of them may be (considerably) less belief-like than 
thus far assumed. 
The dual process reinterpretation of Baillie’s theory involves four 
different supposedly belief-like states: (D2) a dispositional system 2 belief 
that the objective self will die (in all three states); (D1) a dispositional 
system 1 belief that the (subjective) self will not die (in all three states, 
albeit suppressed in E); (O2) an occurrent system 2 belief that the objec-
tive self will die (in the N-state); and (O1) an occurrent system 1 belief 
that the subjective self will die (in the E-state). Two of these, (O2) and 
(D2), are supposed to be system 2 beliefs. (O2) is the occurrent counter-
part of (D2), or in other words, (D2) is the disposition to have the occur-
rent state (O2) in the right circumstances. (O2) cannot be a belief-state, 
however, because occurrent, conscious “beliefs” are not beliefs, but sen-
sory-based mental events such as episodes of inner speech (i.e., silently 
talking to oneself). Hence, (O2) is an event of telling oneself (and/or oth-
ers) that one will (eventually) die, and (D2) is the disposition to do so (in 
the right circumstances). The disposition (D2) is itself unconscious, and 
thus not a system 2 state, even if it is a disposition to produce system 2 
events.17 
                                                
17This disposition (D2) can have various origins—it can be rooted in episodic memories 
of earlier occurrences of (O2), in an episodic memory of telling oneself that one should 
believe in one’s own mortality (because this “belief” follows from or best coheres with 
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The other two belief-like states, (D1) and (O1), are—supposedly—
states of system 1, which can have (amodal) beliefs. (D1) is an uncon-
scious belief of system 1 that the self (in some relevant sense) does not 
die. As argued a few paragraphs back, this belief is reinforced by contin-
uous experience. (O1) is the belief-like state that defines saṃvega, and as 
saṃvega is a conscious experience, (O1) must be conscious as well. How-
ever, system 1 states are unconscious, and consequently, (O1) cannot be 
a system 1 state, but if (O1) is a system 2 state (which is the only alterna-
tive), then it is too similar to (O2) to explain saṃvega. The solution to this 
problem is to give up the implicit and unwarranted assumption that (O1) 
is wholly conscious. More plausibly, (O1) is a complex state that involves 
both an unconscious system 1 belief, and conscious system 2 events. The 
system 1 belief is an occurrent and fleeting (D1)-suppressing belief in 
one’s own mortality. The actual, conscious experience of saṃvega is the 
system 2 counterpart of the unconscious mental stress resulting from 
the suppression of (D1) and of the occurrent system 1 belief in the mor-
tality of the subjective self.18 
The foregoing can be summarized in the same format as Baillie’s 
theory and the both-systems-have-beliefs dual process reinterpretation 
presented above as follows: 
In all three states—A, N, and E—the subject has a disposi-
tion to consciously affirm its own mortality (in the form 
of an inner/outer speech event), and an unconscious, dis-
                                                                                                                     
one’s other “beliefs”), and/or in an unconscious belief that one should believe in one’s 
own mortality. 
18It seems likely that causality runs both ways and/or that there are complex interac-
tions between the occurrent system 1 belief or beliefs in the mortality of the subjective 
self and the occurrent, conscious mental events of system 2. For example, Bud-
dhaghosa’s suggestions on how to achieve saṃvega suggest that (O1) is caused by con-
scious—and therefore, system 2—events. 
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positional system 1 belief that the subjective self will not 
die. 
In the N-state, the subject has a conscious (system 2) event 
realizing the first of these dispositions. 
In the E-state (i.e., saṃvega) the subject has an occurrent, 
unconscious (system 1) belief that the subjective self will 
die, temporarily repressing the contrary dispositional be-
lief (i.e., the second of the two dispositions), as well as 
conscious (system 2) events caused by the ensuing uncon-
scious (system 1) mental stress. 
A comparison of the two dual process theories of saṃvega (thus summa-
rized) points at three important differences. Firstly, in the second theory, 
unconscious processes play a much more central role than in the first. 
Secondly, where the first theory speaks of system 2 beliefs, the second 
speaks of system 2 episodes of inner/outer speech. And thirdly, in the 
second theory the E-state or saṃvega involves both systems rather than 
just system 1. Although these differences are important, they do not en-
tail a radical difference between the two theories. The jury may still be 
out on which variety of dual process theory is correct (although I think 
that Carruthers’s theory is more extensively supported than any of its 
competitors), but both varieties can accommodate structurally identical 
theories of saṃvega—that is, theories that involve the same states with 
sufficiently similar “contents.” In either case, saṃvega or the E-state is 
characterized by a terrifying system 1 belief that the subjective self will 
die, which temporarily suppresses a death-denying dispositional system 
1 belief, while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject’s mortal-
ity. Nevertheless, while this gives us a reasonably well-developed and 
empirically grounded theory of what kind of state saṃvega is, it does not 
yet address the second weakness in Baillie’s theory mentioned above, 
and more importantly, it offers no clues on how saṃvega produces its 
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morally motivating effects. These are among the topics of the following 
sections. 
 
States of Denial and Transcendence 
Contrary to Baillie’s suggestion, for most people the death-affirming A 
and N-states are not the normal states. Rather, most people deny their 
deaths. Of course, they don’t deny their biological deaths, but most people 
believe that their essential, subjective self (i.e., their soul, spirit, etc.) will 
somehow survive death—that is, most people believe in some kind of af-
terlife, rebirth, or some other form of essential immortality. Ernest 
Becker called this kind of belief the “denial of death.” 
By implication, there is a state preceding the A-state and its oc-
current counterpart N, namely a state of denial, which I shall call the D-
state. In the D-state the subject has a dispositional system 2 belief that the 
self (in some relevant sense) will not die, or has a disposition to con-
sciously deny its own mortality. Like the A-state, the D-state has an occur-
rent counterpart, D*, in which the subject realizes this disposition by 
denying death. 
The A and N-states are the secular counterparts of the more com-
mon D and D*-states, but unlike A and N, D and D* do not involve dissocia-
tion. According to Baillie, “N is an essentially dissociated condition” in-
volving “both believing that I will die, and also not believing it,” but this 
dissociation is wholly absent in D. The greater “psychological integra-
tion” that E is supposed to establish is already established in D. Of course, 
this psychological integration comes at the cost of rejecting or disbeliev-
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ing the fact of mortality,19 but that matters little to the subject. Further-
more, that E involves greater psychological integration is plausible only 
if after experiencing saṃvega the subject does not revert to the dissocia-
tive A or N-state, and that is rather unlikely. 
According to Seymour Epstein (“Cognitive,” “Integration”), sys-
tem 1 beliefs (or beliefs of the experiential system in his terminology) 
(can) change under the influence of repeated experience.20 This raises 
the question whether there could be a state—let’s call it the B-state—that 
is brought forth by repeated experience of saṃvega (i.e., the E-state). The 
B-state would be the dispositional counterpart of the occurrent E-state (in 
the same way that A and D are the dispositional counterparts of N and D*, 
respectively). In the B-state the subject would no longer have the disposi-
tional death-denying system 1 belief that is present in all other states, 
but would have replaced that by a belief in the mortality of its subjective 
self, thus transcending the dissociation of states A and N. Considering 
that Baillie and others (see Baillie for examples) describe the E-state as 
involving a kind of panic and terror that drives out all capability of ra-
tional thought, if being in the B-state would be anything like being in the 
E-state, then the price of transcending dissociation may very well be that 
of leaving behind sanity. However, this would assume that a dissociative, 
occurrent state is representative (at least in the relevant respects) for a 
non-dissociative, dispositional state, and that assumption stands in need 
of independent support. If the panic and terror in E result from the sud-
den and unexpected realization of one’s mortality, then there is no ground 
                                                
19For a thorough review of theories of “surviving death” and why they fail—thus estab-
lishing that it is an undeniable fact that we are mortal—see Johnston. See also Brons. 
20Epstein and Pacini write that the experiential system 1 “changes with repetitive or 
intense experience” (463; emphasis added). Saṃvega certainly seems to qualify as an 
intense experience. 
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for panic and terror in the B-state, and consequently, B would be nothing 
like E. 
A more fundamental question than what it would be like to be in 
the B-state is whether that hypothetical state is even possible. As men-
tioned above, the death-denying system 1 belief (which is present in all 
other states) is continuously reinforced by experience. All experience is 
experience of the subjective (or experiencing) self, reconfirming its ex-
istence and—more importantly—its existential coincidence with experi-
enced reality. It does not seem plausible that an occasional experience of 
saṃvega can compete with that. Hence, while Baillie’s theory and/or its 
dual process reinterpretations must certainly be extended in one direc-
tion—by adding the death-denying D-state and its occurrent counter-
part—there probably are no other additional states. 
 
On the Possibility of Other Causes of Saṃvega  
Buddhaghosa (IV.63) mentions eight grounds of saṃvega—birth, aging, 
sickness, death, suffering of loss, past suffering caused by rebirth, future 
suffering caused by rebirth, and present suffering caused by the search 
for food—but significantly, meditation on death is the only exercise that 
is (explicitly) intended to bring about saṃvega. Even if the other seven 
are “grounds” (vatthu) of saṃvega, apparently they are so to a lesser or 
different extent, but that is to be expected if the theory of saṃvega pre-
sented above is right. Saṃvega then requires a stable, dispositional belief 
of system 1 and a terrifying, occurrent system 1 belief that contradicts 
this dispositional belief. This scenario, summarized below, is specific 
enough to suspect that it does not have very many instances. 
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In all states, the subject has a dispositional system 1 belief 
that p.21 
In the D and D*-states, the subject has a dispositional sys-
tem 2 belief that p, or a disposition to consciously affirm 
that p. 
In the D*-state, the subject consciously realizes this second 
disposition. 
In the A, N, and E-states, the subject has a dispositional sys-
tem 2 belief that not-p, or a disposition to consciously af-
firm that not-p (or deny p). 
In the N-state, the subject consciously realizes this third 
disposition. 
In the E-state, the subject has an occurrent system 1 belief 
that not-p, temporarily suppressing the first dispositional 
belief. 
James Baillie sees only two plausible scenarios similar to the “expecta-
tion of nothingness” (i.e., saṃvega) and he is somewhat skeptical about 
the second. The first is the recognition of the fact that I might not have 
existed. The fact that my existence is radically coincidental is not nearly 
as threatening or terrifying as the fact of my mortality, however. That 
my existence is coincidental cannot undo that existence, but death will 
do so. 
                                                
21“p” should not be read as a placeholder for a single specific proposition here, but as a 
placeholder for some member of a loosely bounded set of very similar propositions, 
which includes both the proposition that the subjective self will die and the proposition 
that the objective self will die, for example. 
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The second case Baillie considers is that of the cessation of some 
other “arena of presence and action” that is close to mine. This sugges-
tion is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, I have no system 1 
beliefs (or aliefs, in Baillie’s theory) about the subjective self of the other. 
There is no level of intimacy that gives me access to (the thing at) the 
center of the other’s arena. My beliefs about that arena—and thus about 
the other’s subjective self—are inferred beliefs by my mind. Neither do I 
have system 1 beliefs about the (necessary, continuing) presence of the 
other of similar strength as my system 1 beliefs about the (necessary, 
continuing) presence of myself. “I” am always there (seeing, experienc-
ing), but the other is not, and was not always there either.22 
Secondly, it is far from obvious that what shocks or terrifies me 
in or about the sudden realization of the inevitable death of the other 
that I am so intimate with (assuming that it does) is the cessation of 
“that unique point of view” (S202). Alternative interpretations of such a 
shock (if it occurs) are that it is a selfish shock born from the realization 
that the other will cease to be present in my arena, or that it is an em-
pathic shock in which I feel (something like) what I envision the other to 
feel if the other would be in the E-state. In the latter case—let’s call it em-
pathic saṃvega—I am experiencing saṃvega (in diluted form, perhaps) on 
behalf of the other: the envisioned experiences of the other are envi-
sioned as one’s own. By implication, empathic saṃvega involves the same 
kinds of beliefs (or other mental events), and therefore, is not really a 
different kind of samvegic state. (And I doubt that “selfish shock” about 
the other’s death, the other alternative interpretation, can be fitted in 
the pattern summarized above.) 
Given Baillie’s oversight of the “denial of death” (i.e., the D-state), 
it is no surprise that his suggestions for alternative samvegic scenarios 
                                                
22This may be different for conjoined twins, but I’ll ignore that rather uncommon case. 
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start from the dissociative A-state, but Buddhist thought suggests anoth-
er case that—at least potentially—involves all the states distinguished 
above: the realization (in the E-state) that there is nothing, no thing, at 
the center of the arena. Although this insight is gradually gaining 
ground in Western science and philosophy, it remains controversial out-
side Buddhist philosophy.23 I’ll ignore that controversy here, and will as-
sume that it is true that there is no thing at the center. The default be-
lief, however, is that there is something at the center of my “arena of 
presence and action,” and that that something is me or my “self.” That 
is, the default belief (in the D-state) is that there are self-defining essenc-
es. Contrary to that belief, Buddhist philosophers, but also John Locke 
and David Hume, for example, argued that there is no single part of a self 
that must remain the same for someone to count as the same person. 
Selves are just bundles of experiences (Hume) bound together by 
memory (Locke), psychological continuity and connectedness (Parfit 
Reasons), or the stories we tell about ourselves (e.g., Dennett). Hence, ra-
ther than the thing at the center, the self is the center itself: it is the 
point of view and the “center of narrative gravity” (Dennett); and the 
notion of a “self” is—in Buddhist terms—nothing but a “convenient des-
ignator.” 
                                                
23Notwithstanding the mainstream belief in essential selves, there are quite a few prom-
inent defenders of a no-self view, including Parfit (Reasons); Dennett; and Metzinger. An 
interesting question is why the belief in essential selves is so strong in Western thought. 
Obviously, that question is outside the scope of this article, but there is a suggestion by 
Mark Fisher and Jeremy Gilbert that is worth mentioning. They argue that submission 
to the dehumanizing work environments typical of capitalism can only be legitimated 
and made tolerable by the idea of an essential, authentic self that is isolated from and 
unaffected by the person-as-worker. Charles Lindholm makes a similar point, but traces 
the history of the belief in an authentic self further back (and better documents his 
case). If they are right, then the belief in a self-defining essence is ideology (in the 
Marxian sense of that term), which would explain the belief’s pull and pervasiveness. 
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In the A-state and its occurrent counterpart N, the subject 
“knows” all that. That is, system 2 realizes and understands that there is 
nothing at the center (or is disposed to say so), but system 1 does not: 
system 1 continues to believe that there is something, some thing, at the 
center and that that thing is its essential being. This belief is originated 
in and reinforced by the biases of system 1, particularly by its bias to 
construct an easy story based on nothing but available, activated “evi-
dence” (i.e., experience). I am always there in my experience; therefore, I 
am; therefore, there is some thing that is me at the center of my subjec-
tive universe (my arena). In the E-state, which can be brought about by 
meditation, but perhaps also in other ways, there is an occurrent system 
1 belief that contradicts this dispositional system 1 belief in the self. 
Thus far, this alternative scenario seems to fit in the above-
summarized framework of states involved in saṃvega perfectly. The only 
thing missing is that the E-state is a state of shock (that is what “saṃvega” 
literally means), and that this state is religiously and morally motivating. 
There appears to be some evidence for both, however. Miguel Farias and 
Catherine Wikholm cite statistical and anecdotal evidence for the occur-
rence of anxiety and other shock-like states as a result of meditation. 
And in a psychological study of the effects of meditation retreats in Thai-
land, Tipawadee Emavardhana and Christopher Tori point out that “the 
thought of selflessness can lead to severe anxiety” (195) and is even po-
tentially dangerous if not guided appropriately. Emavardhana and Tori 
also found that the experience significantly and positively affects religi-
osity (i.e., is religiously motivating). 
Whether the anxiety and potential danger Emavardhana and Tori 
perceive is similar to the shock of saṃvega is debatable, however. They 
warn that “if the deconstruction of the ego can occur within a structured 
environment, which provides supportive philosophical reasons for the 
attainment of selfnessness, this process can be safe for those without se-
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rious psychiatric problems” (203), but this is not a warning for saṃvega, 
but for a situation in which the subject has not progressed beyond the 
state of denial D and suddenly jumps to the occurrent belief typical of E. It 
is a warning for a state E* (rather than E, which follows A rather than D) 
in which there is no rational framework of beliefs to explain the shock-
ing system 1 experience. In case of saṃvega, however, the E-state follows 
the A-state (or N), and therefore, the subject’s system 2 has already ac-
cepted the falsity of the claim that there is a self or that I will not die, 
and the shock in the E-state is caused only by an occurrent belief of sys-
tem 1 that (more or less) conforms with what the subject (’s system 2) 
already professes to believe. Moreover, Emavardhana and Tori’s claim 
that “the deconstruction of ego” is “safe” if backed by “supportive philo-
sophical reasons” (etc.) appears to mean that if the N-state is achieved 
first, then the occurrent system 1 belief that is typical for state E or E* 
does not lead to shock (or “severe anxiety”). In other words, if an E-like 
(i.e., E or E*) state follows N as in the samvegic pattern, then there is no 
shock. 
The anecdotal evidence of anxiety and shock resulting from med-
itation presented by Farias and Wikholm is also better explained as 
jumping from D to E* than as saṃvega. They describe cases of adherents 
to pop-Buddhism or “mindfulness” in search of their true selves who are 
confronted with the unexpected system 1 belief that there is no self. In 
other words, in these cases, the subject has a firmly held belief in p (i.e., 
is in state D or D*) and then—in meditation—has an experience that leads 
to a system 1 belief that not-p. The state of shock and anxiety is caused 
by the sudden disruption of a firmly held belief in the self, necessitating 
a revision of a subjectively important part of the subject’s worldview. In 
case of saṃvega, on the other hand, the shocking occurrent belief only 
conflicts with system 1 and is already fully accepted—and perhaps even 
anticipated—by system 2 (or by the subset of the subject’s beliefs that are 
routinely expressed and/or affirmed by system 2).  
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Another way to look at this difference is in terms of dissociation 
versus psychological integration. In the meditative shock cases, the sub-
ject moves from a non-dissociative (integrated) D or D*-state to a dissoci-
ative E*-state, but in case of saṃvega it is the other way around: the sub-
ject moves from a dissociative A or N-state to a non-dissociative (inte-
grated) E-state. It should be clear that these are two very different kinds 
of shock, and therefore, that even if the meditational experience of no-
self is or can be shocking and religiously motivating, it does not involve 
saṃvega. 
Perhaps, it is no coincidence that the only technique Bud-
dhaghosa advises to achieve saṃvega is meditation on death. Saṃvega is 
the sudden, shocking realization by system 1 of its own mortality after 
the subject has already acknowledged that fact. That is a very specific 
scenario indeed, and it seems likely that no other set of beliefs can have 
the same effects. 
 
Saṃvega  and Moral Motivation 
Moral motivation is a motivation to do the right thing, but as Michael 
Smith has pointed out, “the right thing” is ambiguous—it can be read 
both de dicto and de re. Read de dicto, being motivated to do the right 
thing is being motivated to do what is supposed (or said, or believed) to 
be right; read de re, it is being motivated to do what really is right. To 
clarify the difference, suppose there is a culture that values fierceness 
and in which violence of men towards women is morally right.24 Further 
suppose that such violence really is morally wrong and that it really is 
right to protect women (as well as other people) from harm. Then, a 
                                                
24According to Chagnon, the Yanomamö are such a culture, but this claim is controver-
sial. 
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male member of that culture who is motivated to do the right thing de 
dicto is motivated to be violent to women, but a male member of that 
same culture who is motivated to do the right thing de re is not motivated 
to be violent to women and to protect them from harm instead. 
The notion of de re moral motivation presupposes that there are 
things that “really are right.” Cultural relativists (as well as subjectivists) 
would reject this, of course, and claim that there is only de dicto rightness 
(i.e., things that are said to be right by some belief system or culture). 
And even among moral theorists that agree that there are things that 
“really are right” there is widespread disagreement about what exactly 
is right—ethical egoists, utilitarians, and virtue ethicists, for example, 
have rather different opinions about this. Furthermore, rightness rela-
tive to a moral theory is not de re rightness, but just another variety of de 
dicto rightness. De re rightness is not necessarily the same as moral objec-
tivity, however—there is no prima facie reason to believe that intersub-
jectivity is insufficient. And if there are things about which virtually eve-
ryone would agree that they are right (given sufficient time for reflec-
tion if necessary), then those are “really right” in the here relevant sense. 
There are at least two plausible candidates for intersubjective 
general principles of de re rightness. Firstly, in most influential moral 
theories in both Western and Asian philosophical traditions goodness 
tends to be associated with (moderate) altruism, and moral psychologists 
also often understand moral motivation as a motivation to behave pro-
socially (i.e., altruistically). And secondly, Derek Parfit (Matters 565-569) 
points out that virtually everyone agrees that undeserved suffering is 
bad. Although this may be sufficient for intersubjective wrong-ness, it 
seems to me that a much stronger claim can be made about the moral 
status of suffering (in a broad, non-technical sense that may overlap 
with dukkha but is not identical to it): all suffering is inherently, objec-
tively (and not just intersubjectively) bad. Anyone who denies this either 
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does not understand what suffering is or what “bad” means.25 If the fore-
going is right, de re moral motivation is (or includes) the motivation to 
be moderately altruistic and/or to reduce suffering (and conversely, a de 
re motivation to do the wrong thing would be a motivation to be egois-
tical and/or to increase suffering). 
The de re/de dicto distinction is not just of theoretical interest, but 
matters here because saṃvega is related both to a motivation to do the 
right thing de dicto and to a motivation to do the right thing de re (under-
stood as above), albeit in very different ways. And interestingly, the dif-
ferent ways in which different kinds of moral motivation are produced 
are related to the different kinds of meditation distinguished in this arti-
cle’s introduction. As mentioned there, meditation practices are often 
classified as belonging to one of two main kinds: samatha and vipassanā 
meditation. The aim and purpose of samatha or tranquility meditation, 
which is associated with mindfulness, is to achieve states of concentra-
tion in which all attention is focused on its object. The aim and purpose 
of vipassanā or insight meditation is to gain and deepen understanding of 
impermanence, no-self, and suffering. 
The meditation on death as described in Buddhaghosa’s Visud-
dhimagga does not fit well in this scheme, because it can be understood 
as being of the first as well as of the second kind. If the goal of medita-
tion on death is mindfulness of death, then it is a kind of tranquility 
meditation; if its goal is to gain or deepen insight into death as imper-
manence and a cause of suffering, then it is a kind of insight meditation. 
Perhaps then, it is both. 
                                                
25Parfit (Matters 565-569) argues for this claim on the grounds that suffering is never 
deserved. From that premise, and the premise that undeserved suffering is bad, it fol-
lows that all suffering is bad. 
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Buddhaghosa writes that the meditation on death should lead to 
mindfulness of death and saṃvega (VIII.5-6), suggesting that these are 
distinct goals, and therefore, that saṃvega is not mindfulness of death, 
but is related to some kind of insight (if the tranquility/insight classifica-
tion is exhaustive). That saṃvega is not mindfulness of death is also im-
plied by the suggestion that the latter should lead to the former in the 
last sentence of III.58. Conversely, one would expect that saṃvega leads 
to some kind of mindfulness of death. Regardless of how exactly saṃvega 
and mindfulness of death are causally related, these (and other) passages 
in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga strongly suggest that the two come to-
gether (or should come together, at least). Hence, saṃvega may not be 
mindfulness of death, but is inseparable from it, and is simultaneously 
related to a relevant kind of insight. Terror Management Theory ex-
plains how mindfulness of death produces de dicto moral motivation. 
Saṃvega-related insight, on the other hand, produces de re moral motiva-
tion. 
Terror Management Theory (TMT) is a psychological theory 
based on Ernest Becker’s writings about the denial of death (see above).26 
According to Becker, much of civilization (religion especially) is a de-
fense mechanism against the fear (or “terror”) of death. Civilization is an 
“immortality project”—it allows me to become part of and contribute to 
something that not just survives my biological death, but that seems to 
offer the promise of eternal life. TMT took many of Becker’s ideas, 
turned them into testable hypotheses, and then put them to the test. Ac-
cording to TMT, “the awareness of death gives rise to potentially debili-
tating terror that humans manage by perceiving themselves to be signif-
icant contributors to an ongoing cultural drama,” and “reminders of 
                                                
26For short introductions into TMT, see Greenberg and Arndt or Kesebir and Pyszscyn-
ski. For a non-academic, book-length introduction, see Solomon, Greenberg, and 
Pyszczynsky. 
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death increase devotion to one’s cultural scheme of things” (Solomon, 
Greenberg, and Pyszczynsky 211). Hence, much of what we (humans) do 
and believe is driven by “terror management,” controlling the fear of 
death, and “effective terror management is faith in a meaning providing 
cultural worldview and the belief that one is a valuable contributor to 
that meaningful world” (Greenberg and Arndt 403). In other words, re-
minding people of their mortality—or increasing “mortality salience”—
leads them to bolster both their worldviews and their beliefs that they 
are valuable contributors to the world according to that worldview. This 
hypothesis is usually called the “Mortality Salience Hypothesis” (MSH), 
and is the most extensively tested of the TMT hypotheses. A meta-
analysis covering 164 articles on 277 experiments concluded that MSH 
“is robust and produces moderate to large effects” (Burke, Martens, and 
Faucher 187). 
Mindfulness (sati/smṛti) literally means memory or consciousness 
of something.27 Mindfulness of death is the conscious awareness that one 
will eventually and inevitably die. Hence, mindfulness of death is mortal-
ity salience (although perhaps an especially intense variety thereof), and 
achieving mindfulness of death is increasing mortality salience. Mind-
fulness of death is religiously motivating because—according to MSH—
increasing mortality salience leads among others to religious worldview 
defense. Awareness of death raises religious (and other cultural) identifi-
cation and strengthens belief in (or consent to) religious doctrine, but 
also increases negativity (and even hostility) towards other religions 
(and cultures). De dicto moral motivation is produced in the same way.28 
For example, if tolerance is a key value in the subject’s worldview, then 
                                                
27See Lopez (92-99) on the concept of “mindfulness” and its recent evolution. 
28Religious motivation is always de dicto. 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 117 
 
 
an increase in mortality salience leads to an increase in tolerance (rather 
than in hostility; Greenberg et al.). 
Recall that Buddhaghosa recommended the meditation on death 
as one of two general meditation subjects (III.57-59). The other kind of 
exercise is aimed at gradually extending “loving-kindness” (mettā), from 
(at first) just the community of monks to all of mankind (III.58) and ulti-
mately the whole universe (chapter IX). Although “mettā” is usually 
translated as “loving-kindness” or “benevolence,” these terms do not 
cover the same semantic field (as is the case with many other transla-
tions of Buddhist terms). Mettā is comparable to the love one feels for 
one’s friends—it is a genuine care for the other’s well-being similar to 
what Daniel Batson (“Empathy”; Altruism) calls “empathic concern”—but 
to be applied universally rather than to specific targets. In the combina-
tion of Buddhaghosa’s two general meditation subjects, it is this second 
meditation that provides the content to the de dicto moral motivation: 
mindfulness of death or mortality salience produces a motivation to be 
benevolent.29 Furthermore, Batson (Altruism) has shown that empathic 
concern produces altruistic motivation, and consequently, if mettā is 
empathic concern, then a de dicto moral motivation to be benevolent is 
also a motivation to do the right thing de re.30 
While mindfulness of death may be inseparable from saṃvega, the 
two are not identical, and the TMT explanation of how mindfulness of 
death produces de dicto moral motivation does not explain how samvegic 
shock motivates. The state of (increased) mortality salience and the fear 
                                                
29This, however, is not how Buddhaghosa argues for the “usefulness” of the meditation 
on loving-kindness in III.58. Rather, his argument, which reminds of Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, is that with loving-kindness to all of mankind, the monk will be trusted and not 
disliked by everyone, and therefore, can go wherever he wants. 
30But this is rightness de re, not motivation de re. 
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of death figuring in TMT are not saṃvega; they are not states of shock or 
panic such as those described by James Baillie and others. And the MSH 
explanation of how mindfulness is or can be morally motivating does not 
depend on saṃvega either. By implication, if it is the shocking aspect of 
saṃvega that is morally motivating, then it does not motivate (just) 
through mindfulness. As already mentioned above, however, the fact 
that saṃvega is the desired outcome of a meditation exercise suggests 
another way in which saṃvega could be morally motivating: if the medi-
tation on death is both tranquility meditation and insight meditation in 
a single exercise, and saṃvega plays no necessary role in the first (that is, 
in the kind of meditation associated with mindfulness), then it must be 
associated with insight; then saṃvega must be morally motivating 
through an improved understanding of impermanence, no-self, and/or 
suffering. 
If it is assumed that saṃvega results in insight(s), then what kind 
of insights could those be, and how do they lead to moral motivation in 
turn? Unfortunately, while TMT provides an empirically tested frame-
work explaining how and when mindfulness of death can be morally mo-
tivating, there is no similar empirically supported theoretical framework 
for explaining saṃvega as insight, and for that reason, the answer to the-
se questions in the remainder of this section is somewhat speculative. 
There are at least three obvious (to me) ways in which saṃvega 
could be morally motivating through insight. Firstly, for the lucky 
among us who never experience(d) life-threatening suffering or vio-
lence, saṃvega is the closest to that experience one can get. Saṃvega is 
facing death from a safe distance, but it is facing death nevertheless, and 
it is the only way to experience what victims of extreme suffering or vio-
lence go through, aside from undergoing such suffering or violence one-
self. In this way, saṃvega produces insight into suffering. 
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Secondly, the confrontation with the threat of death in saṃvega 
counters another, misleading encounter with that threat that many of us 
are probably more familiar with: the adrenaline rush resulting from do-
ing something stupid enough to almost get oneself killed. Someone who 
never experienced saṃvega but has experienced that adrenaline rush can 
only (sub-consciously) associate life-threatening situations with that 
adrenaline rush. Saṃvega hurts; the adrenaline rush, on the other hand, 
is experienced by many as pleasurable (and some people actively seek it). 
The consequence should be obvious: having experienced saṃvega chang-
es one’s subjective perspective on life-threatening situations: its experi-
ence drives out any positive or pleasurable association. And because the 
threat of death is one of the most elemental kinds of suffering, this 
change in perspective produces further insight in suffering. 
Thirdly, whatever the mind consciously or unconsciously infers 
from the new or changed insight in its own mortality depends to at least 
some extent on what else it believes. If one does not (firmly) believe in 
an afterlife or some other kind of survival after death, then in or after 
saṃvega, it doesn’t just become painfully obvious that the existence of 
the subjective self is limited, but also what this implies: that there are no 
second chances or do-overs. It is the insight that the brevity of life im-
plies that there is a limit to what one can do, and that the irreversibility 
of time implies that nothing of what one ends up doing can be undone. 
Of course, one may already be disposed to affirm all of this (or have sys-
tem 2 beliefs with these contents), but during and after saṃvega it is sys-
tem 1 that may come to realize all this (and while system 1 can ignore 
system 2, system 1 cannot be ignored). This insight (or these insights) 
then, results (result) in a sense of urgency, which suggests that the 
common translation of “saṃvega” as “sense of urgency”—while not a lit-
eral translation—does capture a key aspect of this state and/or its ef-
fects. 
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If these sketchy remarks are right, then saṃvega produces and 
deepens insights in the nature of suffering and the brevity and irretriev-
ability of an individual’s life. Presumably, in most individuals these in-
sights together strengthen the motivation to avoid and/or decrease suf-
fering, but that is not a moral motivation (de re, by the standard set 
above) if it is just a motivation to avoid and/or decrease one’s own suf-
fering. However, if these insights make suffering intolerable, then they 
will make all suffering (rather than just my own) intolerable if I do not 
strictly separate myself from others, and that would result in moral mo-
tivation (de re, by that same standard). 
This argument may seem similar to Śāntideva’s controversial ar-
gument for altruism in Bodhicaryāvatāra 8:101-103 (see Harris for an 
analysis of interpretations of Śāntideva’s argument), but there are signif-
icant differences. Śāntideva’s argument seems to be something like the 
following: Suffering must be prevented (103). No suffering belongs to 
anyone (101-102). Therefore, all suffering must be prevented (103).31 In 
contrast, my argument is that because all suffering does belong to some-
one, a reduction of the (subjective) distance between self and others 
makes all suffering intolerable. Furthermore, this “reduction of dis-
tance” does not require a complete dissolution of the (sense of) self, but 
                                                
31While this superficially looks like a syllogism, it turns out not to be one upon closer 
inspection. The two premises can be formalized as ∃x[Sx∧Px] (or as Sc∧Pc) and ∀x[Sx→Ax] (in which A means “does not belong to anyone”), respectively, and the con-
clusion as ∀x[Sx→Px]. Obviously, that conclusion does not follow from the premises, 
but it does if a premise is added stating that “for any x, if x does not belong to anyone 
and there is something that does not belong to anyone and that must be prevented, 
then x must be prevented”; formally: ∀x[(Ax∧∃y[Ay∧Py])→Px]. This additional prem-
ise is implausible, however, and therefore, if this interpretation is correct, then Śān-
tideva’s argument fails. Considering his intended audience—monks who were already 
convinced of the truth of the premises and the conclusion—the alleged “argument” 
may not have been intended as a formal argument, however (see also Harris). 
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merely a well-developed sense of empathic concern (i.e., genuine care 
for others’ well-being), and developing such a sense of empathic concern 
is the aim of loving-kindness meditation. By implication, the combina-
tion of the meditation on death with loving-kindness meditation is as 
essential for (de re) moral motivation through insight as it is for (de dicto) 
motivation through mindfulness. 
While saṃvega is not mindfulness, this non-identity should not be 
mistaken for non-relation. Saṃvega as death-related shock is likely to 
increase mortality salience and mindfulness of death, and conversely, 
mindfulness of death may lead to saṃvega (as Buddhaghosa suggests in 
III.58). In all likelihood, saṃvega and mindfulness of death come together, 
which makes the separation of their effects on moral motivation a rather 
scholastic exercise, especially when it is taken into consideration that in 




Saṃvega is a religiously and morally motivating state of shock that ac-
cording to Buddhaghosa can and should be evoked by meditating on 
death. What kind of state saṃvega is, and how it produces moral motiva-
tion remains unclear in his (and other) writings, however. Addressing 
this omission, in this article I proposed a theory of what saṃvega is, and a 
hypothesis of how it works. 
According to dual process theories there are two kinds of 
thought-like mental processes, organized (loosely) in two systems: the 
experiential, automatic system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. 
In normal circumstances, system 1—more or less—believes it is immortal 
because its beliefs are fed by experience and any experience presupposes 
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and reconfirms the subject’s existence. Saṃvega is a state of shock caused 
by the occurrence of a system 1 belief in its own mortality when system 
2 is already disposed to affirm this. 
This state of shock is morally motivating in (at least) two ways, 
but in either way, Buddhaghosa’s second general meditation exercise—
that on loving-kindness (mettā)—is an essential ingredient. Meditation 
on death is aimed at both saṃvega and mindfulness of death, but those 
two are related in such a way that they most likely come together (or in 
close succession). Mindfulness of death increases mortality salience, 
which together with an increase in loving-kindness as a core value 
(through loving-kindness meditation) produces a motivation to reduce 
suffering. Saṃvega itself produces insight in suffering, which (again) with 
an increase in loving-kindness (etc.) produces a motivation to reduce 
suffering. If it is assumed that suffering is morally bad—and that seems 
to be a plausible assumption—then this motivation to reduce suffering is 
a moral motivation. While this may explain how saṃvega is morally mo-
tivating, it must be emphasized that parts of this explanation are some-
what speculative and in need of further empirical research. Hence, the 
choice of the term “hypothesis” two paragraphs back. 
As mentioned, Buddhaghosa recommends the meditation on 
death as one of two general meditation subjects that are beneficial to 
anyone. The other is loving-kindness meditation. As argued above, the 
combination is essential. What has not been addressed yet, however, is 
the recommendation itself. Should everyone strive to experience saṃve-
ga? Although this question is outside the scope of this article, it is an im-
portant question, and in closing, I want to comment briefly on what is 
recommended and the reasons for recommending it. 
There are very many different forms and techniques of medita-
tion in Buddhism, and many of those seem to have little in common. This 
suggests that “meditation” is a functional rather than a substantive cat-
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 123 
 
 
egory—that is, it is not defined by some substantive properties that all 
activities called “meditation” have in common, but by those activities’ 
function, by what meditation is intended to establish. If this is right, 
then meditation is any mental exercise that results in a certain, specified 
goal. Hence, meditation on death is any mental exercise that results in 
saṃvega and mindfulness of death (i.e., awareness of one’s mortality); 
and loving-kindness meditation is any mental exercise that results in a 
significant increase in mettā, loving-kindness, but perhaps here better 
translated as “empathic concern.” Taking this into account, Bud-
dhaghosa’s recommendation can be read as a recommendation to expe-
rience saṃvega, increase mortality awareness (or mortality salience), and 
increase (untargeted, universal) empathic concern.32 
Buddhaghosa recommends the two general meditation subjects 
because they are “very beneficial” (bahūpakāra; III.59) to the meditating 
individual, and they probably are if the underlying karmic worldview is 
accepted, but without assuming kamma, rebirth, and liberation (nibbāna) 
this eudaimonistic argument is questionable. Arguably, in order to flour-
ish a human being needs neither samvegic shock33 nor loving-kindness 
beyond a minimum required to be socially accepted. However, this 
judgment changes radically if one takes a social (rather than individual, 
eudaimonistic) point of view. If suffering is bad, and people with 
samvegic experience(s) and increased loving-kindness/empathic concern 
are motivated to reduce suffering, then indeed mental exercises to evoke 
saṃvega and to increase mortality awareness and empathic concern are 
socially desirable. 
                                                
32Perhaps increasing both empathic concern and familiarity with saṃvega results in the 
(more frequent) experience of empathic saṃvega (see above) as well, and probably, em-
pathic saṃvega further increases both insight in suffering and empathic concern. 
33On the contrary, for human flourishing, the death-denying (and non-dissociative) D-
state would be preferable even to the death-affirming A-state. 
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